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EAST V. WEST: THE UNITED STATES’ INDO-PACIFIC ECONOMIC VISION TAKES ON CHINA’S 
BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 
By 
Jaime D. Fell 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Historically, arbitration in China has been a controversial subject. The 
government system, coupled with the private nature of the Chinese government, made 
arbitration a difficult concept to take hold.1 Hong Kong and Singapore are two notable 
countries that have become deeply involved in international arbitration.2 Both countries 
are now classified as international arbitration hotspots.3 However, China, the country 
with the most powerful economy in Asia, has been slow to embrace arbitration.4  
China’s family-run business empires and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which 
were adverse to trans-border commercial ventures, made China hesitant to join the 
international arbitration scene.5 The traditional beliefs held by family-run businesses and 
SOEs focused on confidential and face-to-face negotiations that “saved face.”6 However, 
as China, and Asia in general, became more involved in the international community, 
these countries saw their businesses grow and integrate.7 The increase in intra-Asian and 
Asian trans-border relations with other countries, saw Asian countries begin to embrace 
arbitration.8  
 
* Jaime Fell is the Editor-in-Chief of the Arbitration Law Review, and a 2018 Juris Doctor Candidate at The 
Pennsylvania State University School of Law. 
1 See generally THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION LAW IN A NUTSHELL 352-5 (4th ed., West Academic 
Publishing) (2009). 
2 Id. at 368.  
3 Singapore v. Hong Kong: The Arbitration Battle Intensifies, ASIAN LEGAL BUS. (Dec. 1, 2011), 
https://www.legalbusinessonline.com/features/singapore-v-hong-kongthe-arbitration-battle-
intensifies/57638.  
4 See generally CARBONNEAU, supra note 1, at 352-55.  
5 Patrick M. Norton, Comment, China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Challenges For Arbitration In Asia, 13 U. 
PA. Asian L. Rev. 73-4 (2018).  
6 Id. (Traditional Chinese business owners were focused on keeping a strong reputation within the 
community, which made any known dispute resolutions unattractive). 
7 See Dan Harris, Arbitration in China: It’s Just Fine, Thank You, China Law Blog (Aug. 4, 2018) 
https://www.chinalawblog.com/2018/08/arbitration-in-china-its-just-fine-thank-you.html. 
8 See id.  
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Arbitration has since taken hold in Asia. In recent years, the China International 
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission has reported the largest number of 
international arbitrations in the world.9 China has realized the benefits of international 
arbitration that have been lamented by Europe and the United States: (1) a neutral forum 
compared to national courts, (2) more confidentiality compared to national courts, and (3) 
the ease of award enforcement in arbitral proceedings compared to court judgments.10 
Additionally, China’s recent Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an economic undertaking of 
great ambition, has made arbitration a necessity for the Chinese government.11  
China’s aggressive overseas development policies have prompted the United 
States to respond with a development program of their own, albeit several years later.12 
The Indo-Pacific Economic Vision is an aggressive investment initiative by the United 
States government to combat the extensive and powerful reach of China’s BRI.13   
China has come a long way in arbitration, while the United States has already 
embraced the practice. The two investment and development initiatives by the two world 
powers are going to have a major effect on international arbitration. Countries that have 
not utilized arbitral agreements may be thrust into the international arbitration scene. 
Additionally, the two initiatives can highlight and potentially help solve longstanding 
disputes that China and the United States have with each other, and with other 
countries.14 Finally, with the unprecedented amount of arbitral proceedings that are likely 
to follow from the two initiatives, international arbitration hubs like Singapore and Hong 
Kong may become overwhelmed, prompting a need for more countries to step up and 
assist with the overload.15  
A. China’s Belt and Road Initiative  
China’s President Xi Jinping announced the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013.16  
 
9 See Norton, supra note 5, at 73-4.  
10 See id.  
11 Arbitrators share views on Belt and Road and more, GLOBAL ARBITRATION REVIEW (June 14, 2018), 
https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1170568/arbitrators-share-views-on-belt-and-road-and-more. 
12 See Shi Jiangtao & Owen Churchill, US Competes with China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ with US$113 
million Asian Investment Programme, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 2, 2018. 
13 See id.  
14 See generally CARBONNEAU, supra note 1, at 355.  
15 See Norton, supra note 5, at 94.  





The initiative is of unprecedented proportions, with the focus being on using the 
enormous foreign currency reserves that China has generated through trade surpluses to 
finance investment and infrastructure developments across Europe and Southeast Asia.17 
The name of the initiative comes from the ancient “Silk Road” land routes and the 
ancient sea routes linking the Middle East and Europe.18 The result is intended to be a 
railroad linking China to Europe through Russia, and commercial seaports connecting 
Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe.19 The investments are being made 
in the areas of energy, mining, industrial innovations, and agriculture.20 
 The total BRI investments in 2017 were $890 billion with President Xi promising 
an additional $124 billion in that year.21 There were over 600 BRI contracts signed by 
parties through 2017.22 Additionally, fifty SOEs were participating in roughly 1,700 
projects through the BRI.23 Investments aside, Chinese corporations had made 
approximately $64 billion in corporate acquisitions through the BRI.24 
 Chinese corporations have the central role in all planning and implementation of 
BRI projects, as well as managing the resulting facilities.25 Chinese banks are also the 
central focus of all financing of BRI projects, with additional assistance from foreign and 
international banks.26 Finally, most of the project construction is being completed by 
Chinese construction companies.27 Although the Chinese are at the center of all BRI 
projects, they are not exclusive to the Chinese.28 All third world countries are welcomed, 
and even encouraged, to participate in the projects. For example, Hong Kong and 
Singapore have already become active in developing roles, particularly in the realm of 
 
17 Kuo, supra note 16.  
18 Id.  
19 See generally id.  
20 Id.  
21 Norton, supra note 5, at 76. 
22 Id.  
23 Id.  
24 Id. at 77.  
25 See id.  
26 Norton, supra note 5, at 77.  
27 Id.  
28 See Kuo, supra note 16.  
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international finance and arbitration.29 Additionally, Japan and GE Financial Services30 
have recently become involved in BRI projects.31 The involvement of third party 
countries added to the already impressive expertise on BRI projects, but also spreads the 
financial risk for those parties involved.  
 As of 2018, BRI projects require an estimated US five trillion dollars of capital.32 
The BRI also involves sixty-five different countries, totaling sixty-five per cent of the 
world’s population.33 The involvement of sixty-five different countries, over 600 
contracts and counting signed, and the vast amount of capital required for the projects, 
the international arbitration community has begun to feel the effects of such an 
initiative.34 As the contracts mature, the projects grow, and more capital is required, the 
effect of the initiative has will only continue to have an impact on all parties involved.  
B. The United States’ Indo-Pacific Economic Vision 
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced The Indo-Pacific Economic Vision 
Initiative on July 30.35 The plan outlines how the United States will attempt to become a 
key economic player in Asia. Becoming economically involved in Asia is a significant 
challenge faced by both former presidents George Bush and Barack Obama.36 President 
Obama attempted to solve the problem by the creating the controversial Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, which was ultimately undone by current president Donald Trump.37 The 
major difficulty is balancing the vast economic power, and high economic and trade 
standards, of the United States with many of the lower standards Asian countries adhere 
 
29 See Norton, supra note 5, at 77.  
30 GE Energy Financial Services is a division of General Electric. This division provides financial and 
technological investment in energy infrastructure projects around the world.  
31 Norton, supra note 5 at 77.  
32 Christopher Chan, Patrick Cheung, Henry Fung, & Catherine Smith, The Belt and Road Initiative: Dispute 
Resolution along The Belt and Road, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 9, 2018), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=9b9d0486-d87a-4d22-99f1-9a56c39f976e 
33 Id.  
34 See generally id.  
35 Prashanth Parameswaran, Trump’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: Confronting the Economic Challenge, THE 
DIPLOMAT (July 31, 2018), https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/trumps-indo-pacific-strategy-confronting-the-
economic-challenge/. 
36 Id.  
37 Id.  
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to.38 The economic imbalances between the two geographic areas makes it difficult for 
United States’ policies to take hold in Asia.39 The economic imbalance also highlights the 
difficulties that budget constraints have on American corporations attempting to establish 
themselves in Asia.40 For example, many Asian countries are not developed economically 
to the point where they can sustain the United States investment strategies.41  
Pompeo stated that investment is to become a pillar of President Trump’s strategy 
in Asia.42 The United States' plan is to increase the financial support in Asia through a 
proposed agency, the United States International Development Finance Corporation.43 
Direct government investment will receive $113 million.44 The current global spending 
cap is to be doubled to $60 billion and invested in the development finance corporation, 
which is used to provide private companies loans to embark on projects overseas.45  
Additional money will be divided up to expand United States’ technology in Asia 
($25 million), and assisting countries in storing their energy resources and boosting 
infrastructure ($50 million combined).46 The Indo-Pacific Economic Vision includes a 
trilateral investment agreement with Japan and Australia, a $350 million investment deal 
to develop new sources of clean water with Mongolia, and an agreement to invest 
millions in projects within Sri Lanka through the Millennium Corp, a development 
agency of the United States’ government.47  
Although the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision does not compare to China in terms 
of amounts of money; the United States believes the quality of their investments will 
make them considerably more competitive in Asia.48 One of the primary critiques of the 
BRI is the lack of focus on Asian countries, however, the United States believes they can 
 
38 See Parameswaran, supra note 36..  
39 See id.  
40 See id.   
41 See generally id.  
42 See Jiangtao, supra note 12.  
43 See id.   
44 Id.  
45 Id.  
46 Parameswaran, supra note 36.  
47 Id.  
48 See generally Peter Pham, How America’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Can Reshape The Region And The 




fill that gap.49 By focusing on countries in Asia that are seemingly forgotten by the BRI, 
most notably, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines, the United States believes they 
can help establish a stronger rule of law in those countries and create a foothold in Asia 
that will benefit all of the countries in the area.50 
II. THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA’S OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT AND INVESTMENT 
IMPACTING ARBITRATION 
A. Contracts and Agreements being a Necessity for both Initiatives to Utilize  
Arbitration has become the preferred method of dispute resolution for BRI 
projects in contracts.51 Arbitration is preferred as it minimizes the risk of “(1) resolving 
disputes in potentially less favorable local courts on the BRI and/or (2) being unable to 
enforce an award or judgment once obtained.”52 
 The Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC) has been the mainstay 
for arbitral disputes arising out of BRI projects to date for many reasons, including its 
maintenance as a pro-arbitration state and its location along the route of many of the BRI 
countries.53 Therefore, Hong Kong is a good example of how contracts and agreements 
will be utilized by the BRI. Since the BRI began, HKIAC has already handled a 
significant amount of BRI cases.54  
To make the HKIAC a fairer forum for BRI disputes, the HKIAC now allows 
parties to choose their arbitrator, or arbitrators.55 The list of arbitrators is not limited to 
arbitrators already on a panel or to the HKIAC’s list of maintained arbitrators.56 China 
has worked with the HKIAC to allow for reciprocal recognition of monetary judgments 
in regards to final arbitration awards and enforcement.57 The pro-arbitration steps taken 
 
49 See generally Pham, supra note 49.  
50 See id.   
51 See Josephine Ma, Is this just the beginning of ‘belt and road’ disputes between China and its partners?, 
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 8, 2018), 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2164105/just-beginning-belt-and-road-disputes-
between-china-and-its. 
52 Id.  
53 Id.  
54 See generally id.  
55 Norton, supra note 5, at 91. 
56 Id.  
57 See id.  
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by the HKIAC allows parties involved in BRI contracts to arbitrate their disputes in a 
neutral forum, knowing that the decision rendered will be respected and enforced by 
China.58 Without arbitration clauses in contracts, the BRI would likely not be possible 
because of the complex contract disputes arising between international parties.  
 International arbitration is essentially the only means to settle international 
disputes.59 Because of arbitration’s importance, the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision will 
need to follow the example set out by the BRI, which is to find a neutral arbitral forum to 
solve disputes and implement a forum selection clause into the arbitration agreement.60 If 
the United States intends for their private corporations to enter into agreements with 
business entities in Asia, they will need to make use of arbitration clauses as these clauses 
have worked effectively with BRI project contracts.  
B. Contract Maturation Creating a Significant Caseload for Arbitral Institutions 
Sarah Grimmer, secretary general of the HKIAC, warned those involved with the  
BRI to “be prepared to see a lot more business disputes on projects linked to China’s 
‘Belt and Road Initiative.’”61 This is because most contracts arising out of similar 
initiatives typically occur during the first year.62 Grimmer stated that between the two to 
five year mark is when disputes typically arise from those contracts.63 The BRI was 
announced in 2013, and roughly five and a half years into the initiative, the number of 
disputes continues to rise.64  
 Contracts are constantly being made, withdrawn from, and disputed. These 
contract issues have kept the HKIAC busy. In 2014, the HKIAC dealt with 252 
arbitration matters arising out of BRI projects, in 2015 they dealt with 271, and in 2016, 
the disputes totaled 262.65 Many of these disputes involved jurisdictional issues and trade 
cases involving minerals and materials required for BRI projects.66 The HKIAC has yet 
to deal with an issue arising out of public disputes which occur when a BRI project has 
 
58 See generally Norton, supra note 5, at 91. 
59 See generally CARBONNEAU, supra note 1, at 352-5. 
60 See Norton, supra note 5, at 91. 
61 Ma, supra note 52. 
62 Id.  
63 See id.  
64 See id.  
65 Id.  
66 See Weixia Gu, China’s Belt and Road Development and a New International Commercial Arbitration 
Initiative in Asia, 51 VNJTL 1305, 1317-9 (2018).  
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gone wrong.67 It is only a matter of time, however, before an issue directly concerning a 
BRI project makes its way into the HKIAC, which is likely to be an extremely complex 
issue.68  
 Adding to the caseload will be the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision. The initiative 
was announced during the summer of 2018.69 Within the first year, the Indo-Pacific 
Economic Vision will likely see many contracts arising out of agreement with Asian 
parties. If the same holds true for the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision contracts as held true 
for BRI projects, disputes are likely to arise within the next one to four years.70  
 Arbitration experts expect that in the next ten years the BRI alone will increase 
the number of arbitral proceedings occurring, not only within the HKIAC, but other 
arbitral institutions in Asia.71 With the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision expecting contract 
disputes to arise from their parties within that same time frame, the HKIAC, and other 
Asian arbitral institutions, may become heavily burdened.72 To alleviate some of the 
expected caseload a solution is required. Predicting the uptick in contract disputes gives 
participating countries time to choose an alternative, non-Asian institution for their 
contracts.73 
C. The Initiatives Furthering International Arbitration in Asian Countries that have 
been Hesitant to Embrace Arbitration  
The embracement of international arbitration has been a slow process in Asia. 
Aside from Singapore and Hong Kong, many other Asian countries view arbitration with 
some skepticism. This skepticism is likely the result of two major components. First, 
some Asian countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and 
numerous others, are considered developing countries, as they have been slow to develop 
economically.74 It is difficult for developing countries to become major players in 
international arbitration because these countries lack the funds and institutions to conduct 
 
67 See Gu, supra note 68, at 1317-19.  
68 See generally id.  
69 Parameswaran, supra note 36. 
70 See generally Paul F. Kirgis, The Contractarian Model of Arbitration and its Implications for Judicial 
Review of Arbitral Awards, 85 Or. L. Rev. 1, 4-5 (2008). Implying that strict adherence or contractarian 
models for arbitration can potentially overload the arbitration system and render it ineffective and increase 
the potential for abuse.  
71 Ma, supra note 52.  
72 See generally Kirgis, supra note 72, at 4.  
73 See generally Gu, supra note 68, at 1319-20.  




international arbitral proceedings properly.75 Additionally, developing countries tend to 
lack the rule of law required for arbitration to take hold.76 
The nature of select Asian governments is the second major reason for 
international arbitration struggling to take hold in Asia. Again, this is prevalent in the 
developing Asian countries. These particular countries tend to see power switch hands 
frequently, with each new power being leery of the concept of arbitration.77 Arbitration 
thrives on freedom and privacy, something that leaders of small, developing countries 
fear as a threat.78 
Both the BRI and the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision can potentially counter the 
issues international arbitration faces in Asia. The introduction of both Chinese and United 
States investment can bring funds to the developing countries that can then be used to 
create proper arbitral institutions and further develop their economy, thereby combatting 
the development issue.79 Parties seeking an arbitral forum for proceedings through BRI 
and the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision investment opportunities will find developing 
arbitral institutions and creating stronger economies attractive.80  
The same solution can be used to solve the rule of law issue. The economic 
opportunities that the initiatives will create can counter the leeriness of leaders in 
developing countries.81 If leaders of developing Asian countries are willing to sacrifice 
some power to bring economic opportunities to their countries, international arbitration 
can thrive in those countries.82    
 
75 See Shihata, supra note 74.  
76 See Justin Bordacahar, The Rule of Law As Created by Arbitrators – An Update on the Discussions At The 
Recent IBA Arbitration Day in Buenos Aires, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Apr. 8, 2018), 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/04/08/iba-buenos-aires-report/. (Because developing 
countries lack rule of law, arbitration in these countries is unattractive, as proceedings can be unfair, awards 
are difficult to enforce, and skilled arbitrators are difficult to employ).  
77 See Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration, 67 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 288–89 (2004). 
78 See generally id.  
79 See Jason Fry, Arbitration and Promotion of Economic Growth and Investment, 13 Eur. J.L. Reform 388, 
391 (2011).  
80 See generally id.  
81 See generally id.  
82 See generally id.  
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III. THE INITIATIVES IMPACTING INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN A POSITIVE MANNER  
A. Arbitration Venues in Asia and Around the World will be Incentivized to 
Improve their Arbitral Forums to Attract Parties of the BRI and the Indo-Pacific 
Economic Vision 
With a large number of contracts being made through the BRI, and the Indo- 
Pacific Economic Vision creating potential arbitration agreements, the need for 
appropriate venues will continue in Asia. Singapore and Hong Kong are already 
international arbitration hubs, but with the vast number of potential arbitral disputes, the 
two countries may not be enough. A desirable venue has three main criteria: (1) the local 
laws support arbitration and the courts will not interfere or hinder the arbitral process; (2) 
the host country of the arbitral proceeding is a part of the New York Convention which is 
crucial for award enforcement; and (3) logistical support for the proceeding will be 
provided, such as translation, proper facilities, and proper access to the country for the 
proceeding.83  
Hong Kong and Singapore have already established the three criteria of a 
desirable arbitral venue. Each country has a well-established legal system, which 
supports arbitration, enforces awards, has proper facilities, and has logistical support.84 
Additionally, arbitral decisions rendered in Hong Kong and Singapore are recognized by 
China, making the two venues desirable and crucial for the BRI and the Indo-Pacific 
Economic Vision.85 Many other countries in Asia are members of the New York 
Convention, such as: Cambodia, Myanmar, Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, 
and several others. However, many of these countries fail one of the other desired 
criteria.86 The logistical support is lacking in many Asian countries, as many do not have 
proper translation support and dedicated arbitration centers.87 On top of failing to meet 
the three criteria, these countries lack the experience desired by parties seeking an arbitral 
forum.88 Even fewer countries have records of awards rendered that were enforced 
 
83 Norton, supra note 5, at 89.  
84 Gu, supra note 68, at 1321. 
85 See id.  
86 See id.  
87 See generally id.  
88 See Piyush Prasad, Arbitration in Singapore and Hong Kong, INTERNATIONAL IMMERSION PROGRAM 
PAPERS, 57 (2017).  
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elsewhere.89 In their current state, these countries do not make extremely attractive 
arbitral forums.90  
The presence of the United States and China will prompt these countries to take 
the final step and improve their arbitral venues, which will make them attractive to 
parties.91 More arbitration proceedings will give these countries the experience in 
international arbitral proceedings that they crucially need. The result will be improved 
international arbitration in Asia, which will improve international arbitration. 
B. Arbitral Institutions Around the World will need to Improve to Handle the 
Number of Disputes that will Arise from the two Initiatives  
Hong Kong and Singapore are desirable arbitral institutions for parties, because 
the parties know that the proceeding will be handled fairly and the award will be 
enforced. Although the HKIAC and SIAC will likely soak up many of the arbitral 
proceedings that arise under the BRI and the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision, the two 
institutions will unlikely be able to handle the potential proceedings.92 Unless other 
institutions can rise and make themselves attractive to international parties, the lack of 
attractive institutions will put a major strain on both the BRI and the Indo-Pacific 
Economic Vision.  
Because the BRI is an initiative that spreads throughout Europe, the BRI will have 
more flexibility than the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision. London, Paris, Geneva, 
Stockholm, and New York are all traditional venues that are favorable to arbitration. The 
greater access of the BRI will lead to the International Chamber of Commerce, London 
Court of International Arbitration, International Center for Dispute Resolution, 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, or the Permanent Court of Arbitration to handle 
many of the arbitral proceedings that arise under the BRI.93 All of these institutions have 
extremely desirable venues, and the institutions residing within have vast experiences 
dealing with complex international arbitration issues.94 Greater access to additional 
institutions opens up possibilities for contracts under the BRI, but severally limits the 
capabilities of contracts under the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision. The BRI, being the 
larger initiative, will make it difficult for the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision to seek the 
desirable HKIAC and SIAC in Asia.  
 
89 See Prasad, supra note 88, at 57.   
90 See generally id.   
91 See generally Kirgis, supra note 72, at 4. 
92 See Norton, supra note 5, at 91. 
93 See id. at 74.  
94 See id. at 74-5.  
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China’s desire to keep the United States out of the geographical location adds to 
the United States’ problem of trying to find an appropriate arbitral institution in Asia.95 
As two of the world leaders, China and the United States have a tense relationship.96 
Among many concerns,97 China will likely try to block the United States out of Asia and 
halt the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision by ensuring that most of their contracts have 
clauses prompting arbitration in Hong Kong or Singapore.98 Because China will prefer 
arbitrating in Asia, as opposed to Europe, alienating the United States in Asia becomes a 
viable strategy.  
The United States will have the ability to arbitrate proceedings in New York.99 
However, many Asian parties may be hesitant to leave Asia, and come to the United 
States, to arbitrate disputes.100 Furthermore, because the BRI is the larger initiative, and is 
likely to have a greater impact on the economy of the respected Asian countries, those 
countries may be more likely to adhere to China and the BRI, as opposed to the Indo-
Pacific Economic Vision.  
C. Geopolitical Conflicts will be Stimulated which will help Alleviate Tension 
Between Adverse Countries  
Many countries that are off-putting, or even hostile, to either China or the United 
States may find themselves entering arbitral agreements to benefit both countries due to 
the BRI and the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision. Potential agreements can lead to 
discussions that would otherwise not have occurred.  
 The United States has had a rocky history in Asia. Some countries, such as South 
Korea and Japan, have become some of the United States’ closest allies. Others, such as 
China and Vietnam, have strained relationships with the United States. The Indo-Pacific 
Economic Vision is an attempt by the United States to open themselves up to Asia and 
 
95 Harini V, ‘America first’ policy in Asia could result in ‘America last,’ expert says, CNBC (Oct 9, 2018) 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/10/america-first-policy-in-asia-could-result-in-america-last.html.  
96 See generally Joshua P. Meltzer & Neena Shanai, The US-China economic relationship: A comprehensive 
approach, BROOKINGS (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-us-china-economic-
relationship-a-comprehensive-approach/.  
97 Many concerns hang over the US-China relationship. These include US tariffs on Chinese goods, 
relationships with North Korea, political differences, the struggle for control in the South China Sea, and 
world economic differences.  
98 See generally Meltzer, supra note 98.  
99 See John Savage, Navigating The Pitfalls Of Arbitration With Chinese Parties, CORPORATE COUNSEL 
BUSINESS JOURNAL (Dec. 6, 2010) http://ccbjournal.com/articles/13294/navigating-pitfalls-arbitration-
chinese-parties. 
100 See id.   
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the economies that reside within.101 The initiative can help combat the rough history that 
the United States has had with these countries and attempt the build a relationship that 
can benefit both countries. Many Asian countries fall on the lower end of the world 
rankings based on their economies.102 The United States consistently ranks near the top, 
giving many of the less developed Asian countries a chance to engage with a world 
economic power.103 The United States will utilize the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision to 
attempt to invest and develop within these countries.104 Although the history between the 
United States and some Asian countries has been strained in the past, the initiative gives 
the countries a chance to reconcile those differences, set aside political differences, focus 
on the future, and help develop an economic relationship that can aid both countries well 
into the future.  
 The same argument can be made between China and many European countries, 
and, also, other countries in Asia. China, and some European countries have had tense 
relationships. Furthermore, China has had a tense history with some Asian countries such 
as South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, predominantly due to the conflict in the South 
China Sea.105 The BRI could have a similar political effect that the Indo-Pacific 
Economic Vision will likely have with the United States and some of its historical 
adversaries.106 However, the BRI is likely to have a greater impact because it is a 
significantly larger initiative and countries may be more inclined to participate for the 
potential economic benefits. Examples of the BRI’s advantage are already showing, as 
BRI projects have found their way into Japan.107   
 
101 See MIL-OSI: East Asia and the Pacific: Remarks on “America’s Indo-Pacific Economic Vision”, 






102 World Economic Outlook Database, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (April 2018) 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/01/weodata/weorept.aspx 
103 See id.  
104 See generally id.  
105 See Wade Shepard, India and Japan Join Forces to Counter China and Build Their Own New Silk 
Road, FORBES (July 31, 2017). 
106 See id.  
107 See Norton, supra note 5, at 79.  
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IV. THE CHALLENGES THE INITIATIVES WILL FACE AND POTENTIAL NEGATIVE IMPACTS 
A. Political Ramifications may Arise Between Countries due to the Competitive 
Nature of the two Initiatives  
Although the United States and China may be able to reconcile some of their 
differences with other countries through their respected initiatives, the potential 
exasperation of political tension between the United States and China could occur. China 
may look at the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision as an attempt by the United States to gain 
control in Asia, undermine the BRI, and potentially gain influence over the South China 
Sea situation.108 If China views the initiative in this manner, the conflict between the 
United States and China could get much worse before it gets better.   
The competition created by the BRI and the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision could 
create political divides between the United States, China, and the countries involved in 
each respective initiative. Because many of the contracts will involve at least one Asian 
party, finding a neutral forum for both parties will be difficult.109 Asian countries will 
prefer Asian institutions and the United States and European countries will prefer their 
respective institutions.110 The current practice indicates that parties can find a neutral 
location, however, this can prove to be difficult with the initiatives because of the 
political nature of the projects.111 Additionally, political tensions can be strained when 
contracting parties from different countries have a dispute. 
Due to the location and reputation of HKIAC and SIAC, many arbitral 
proceedings will likely be conducted in Asian countries. However, the enormous amount 
of money that is likely to be invested through each respected initiative can call into 
question the HKIAC and SIAC, particularly if Asian parties seemingly end up on the 
preferred side of the arbitral award.112  
Finally, it is common BRI contract practice for each party to appoint an arbitrator 
for the proceedings; the third being neutral. It is likely that the neutral arbitrator will 
consistently make the final arbitral decision.113 The United States, China, and the parties 
of BRI and the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision contracts will likely take issue with large 
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contract disputes being decided by a small group of neutral arbitrators “ . . . operating 
under the auspices of independent, non-governmental arbitral institutions.”114 When one 
country feels that its parties are being shorted by neutral arbitrators, especially 
concerning large-scale investment projects, political ramifications can quickly arise.   
 
B. Determining the Applicable Law and Applying it to Complex Disputes can 
Create a Large Number of Problems for Arbitral Institutions  
Identifying an agreed upon choice of law provision is potentially the most 
difficult issue that the BRI and the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision arbitral proceedings 
will experience. Countries likely to host BRI and the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision 
proceedings have laws that are of recent origin and not completely fleshed out.115 
Contrast this to countries, such as the United States and the many European countries, 
who have laws that are old, tried, and consistently applied. Projects arising out of the two 
initiatives will be dealing with common law, civil law, customary law, or sharia law.116  
 The acceptance and promotion of freedom of contract can combat the choice of 
law problem. In the United States, freedom of contract is widely promoted, yet countries 
such as China with strong government intervention prefer to maintain control of such 
practices.117 If countries move towards the allowance of freedom of contract, the parties 
will have the ability to compromise and choose a choice of law provision that best suits 
each party.118  
 Allowing the freedom of contract is crucial, as it will allow arbitral institutions to 
follow the choice of law provisions decided upon by the parties and apply it in the 
proceeding. However, freedom of contract is not a foolproof solution, as even the most 
complex and well-designed contracts cannot foresee every possible dispute that may 
arise.119 Parties often purposely leave contracts open ended to allow for a more flexible 
application of the law.120 Furthermore, these unforeseeable problems are likely to arise 
from exceedingly complex and difficult issues that make the arbitral tribunals’ decision 
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more difficult to ascertain. The confusion surrounding choice of law provisions can lead 
to rulings based on undeveloped laws that may not be satisfactory to both parties.121  
 Identifying a choice of law provision is not a new issue for international law. 
However, due to the vast number of arbitral disputes that are likely to arise out of the BRI 
and the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision initiatives, this issue is exasperated. 
C. Overwhelming Case Loads for Asian Institutions can Lead to Poor Efficiency 
and a Lack of Qualified International Arbitrators  
With the United States moving quickly into Asia and China making  
agreements with countries all around the world, Hong Kong and Singapore, the desirable 
arbitration hubs, can quickly become overwhelmed with cases.122 The number of disputes 
arising out of BRI projects is projected to increase due to contract maturation.123 Since 
the BRI and the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision contracts are maturing on a consistent 
basis, the increase in disputes can overrun arbitral institutions, particularly in Asia.124 
Although the HKIAC and SIAC are experienced institutions and have handled the typical 
yearly increase in arbitral disputes, the potentially drastic uptick in disputes arising from 
the two initiatives can be too much for the institutions to predict and, eventually, handle. 
Experienced institutions may potentially be able to predict the increase in arbitral 
disputes.125 However, having an adequate supply of arbitrators is also a cause for concern 
for the international arbitration community.126 There is a limited pool of experienced 
international arbitrators, which is further limited by those who have experience dealing 
with contracts of BRI size.127 Reliance on a limited pool of arbitrators can slow 
proceedings and make arbitration ineffective in Asian institutions.128 The HKIAC and 
SIAC can find themselves among undesirable institutions because of inefficiency arising 
out of overwhelming disputes and a limited arbitrator pool.  
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Simple supply and demand concepts can likely solve the problem of 
overwhelming disputes and a limited arbitrator pool.129 As previously discussed, Asian 
countries that are typically not engaged in arbitration or have poor institutions may find 
themselves improving in these areas to attract parties to arbitral in their country. 
Furthermore, there is no shortage of attorneys in the world, and a limited arbitrator pool 
can be satisfied by young attorneys with knowledge of international law and a desire to 
become an arbitrator.130 The result is an overall benefit for international arbitration as the 
practice will see an influx of improved arbitral institutions and more young minds 
entering the field.  
V. CONCLUSION  
The international community has yet to see an initiative the size of the Chinese  
Belt and Road Initiative. The BRI is already having a substantial impact on international 
arbitration due to the contracts entered into by foreign parties. With the recent 
announcement of the United States’ Indo-Pacific Economic Vision, international 
arbitration can change for the better. Furthermore, the initiatives will create competition 
and economic opportunities for countries that have stifling economies or are in the 
process of developing.  
 The initiatives are not without their potential problems, as tensions between the 
United States and China can become strained due to competition in Asia, and conflicting 
beliefs over desired arbitral forums and applicable law. Furthermore, once contracts 
begin to mature, arbitral institutions can quickly become overwhelmed and experience 
inefficiency due to slow proceedings and a limited arbitral pool. However, the positive 
outcomes created by the two initiatives can solve the problems that may arise. The 
potential economic opportunities the initiatives bring will prompt countries to improve 
their arbitral institutions and more young minds to enter the field of international 
arbitration. The net benefit will be a positive impact on the international arbitral 
community. 
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